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Abstract
This paper empirically studies time inconsistent preferences in the
context of cigarette smoking behavior. With hyperbolic discounting,
an individual has time inconsistent preferences, which give rise to a
lack of self-control, i.e., she may perpetually postpone the execution of
a plan. This implies that a smoker who wants to quit has a demand
for control devices, e.g., a smoking ban in public areas or a hike in
cigarette excise taxes. This paper empirically tests this implication,
using a sample that is based on survey data from Taiwan. The esti-
mation results indicate that a smoker’s intention to quit has a positive
effect on the smoker’s support for smoking bans and a cigarette excise
tax increase. These results suggest that time inconsistent preferences
are valid in the context of cigarette smoking behavior. This casts doubt
on the validity of the assumption that individuals have time consistent
preferences in Becker and Murphy’s (1988) rational addiction model.
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For several decades, cigarette smoking behavior has been studied by social scientists
from a variety of disciplines. There are two aspects of the behavior which arouse
researchers’ interest. Firstly, cigarette smoking is harmful to one’s health and society
has to bear enormous costs arising from the productivity lost and from the medical
expenses associated with smoking-induced diseases. An understanding of cigarette
smoking behavior thus has important implications for intervention policies. Secondly,
the behavior per se is interesting. It is puzzling why people develop and maintain
a seemingly destructive habit even though most of them are aware of the harmful
consequences and its addictive nature.
Due to their inability to explain smokers’ behavior by the neoclassical framework
and by assuming rationality, early researchers largely regarded cigarette smoking as
myopic (e.g., Houthakker and Taylor, 1966, 1970). The assumption that smokers are
myopic were maintained either implicitly or explicitly, e.g., Lewit and Coate (1982),
Mullahy (1985), Baltagi and Levin (1986), and Jones (1989, 1994). These studies treat
cigarette addiction as habit forming and model the reinforcement effect by allowing
lagged consumption to have an impact on current consumption.
Later on, by allowing agents to recognize the dependence of the current consump-
tion level on past consumption, some researchers were able to reconcile cigarette smok-
ing with rationality. A notable example is the rational addiction model of Becker
and Murphy (1988), where people have time consistent preferences, and are forward-
looking. That is, in Becker and Murphy’s (1988) model people are aware of the addic-
tive nature of cigarette smoking and they choose to smoke simply because the lifetime
beneﬁts are greater than the costs.
Several hypotheses are derived in Becker and Murphy (1988). The most impor-
1tant one is that current consumption positively depends on future consumption. This
implies that current consumption is inversely related to all prices (past, current and
future), or equivalently current consumption is positively related to past and future
consumption. Becker and Murphy’s (1988) rational addiction model has given rise
to a series of studies that empirically test the rationality of cigarette smoking and
other addictive substances. For example, Chaloupka (1990, 1991) uses micro data
and Perkurinen (1991), Keeler, Hu, Barnett and Manning (1993), Becker, Grossman
and Murphy (1994) and Bardsley and Olekalns (1998) use time series data to study
cigarette smoking behavior in the context of the Becker-Murphy (1988) model. Their
empirical ﬁndings are consistent with Becker and Murphy’s (1988) key prediction that
current consumption depends on future consumption.
Recently, researchers have begun to question Becker and Murphy’s rational ad-
diction model on several grounds. First of all, the supporting evidence obtained by
previous studies that test the implications of the Becker-Murphy model may not be
conclusive in regard to the validity of all the assumptions underlying the rational
addiction model. As pointed out by Gruber and Köszegi (2001), what is required to
generate the positive relationship between current cigarette consumption and future
consumption is the “forward looking” assumption only. That is, the time consistency
assumption of the rational addiction model is not really tested. In modifying Becker
and Murphy’s (1988) rational addiction model by allowing an individual’s preferences
to be time inconsistent, Gruber and Köszegi (2001) are able to obtain the same re-
lationship between current consumption and future consumption.1 This means that
while we can conclude from previous empirical evidence that individuals are forward
looking, this evidence does not allow us to infer whether individuals’ preferences are
1Gruber and Köszegi (2001) derive some empirical implications by assuming forward looking behav-
ior but time inconsistent preferences. However, as they acknowledge, these implications are difﬁcult to
test empirically.
2time consistent or not.2
Dissatisfaction with the ability of the rational addiction model of Becker and Mur-
phy (1988) to explain individuals’ struggles with harmful addictions has led some re-
searchers to consider alternative approaches to analyzing individuals’ decision-making
processes. A plausible approach is to view individuals as having a lack of self-control,
which arises from having time inconsistent preferences.
There is ample evidence suggesting that individuals have time inconsistent pref-
erences and face self-control problems. Empirical and experimental ﬁndings in the
economics and psychology literature (see, e.g., Thaler, 1981; Benzion, Rapoport, and
Yagil, 1989; Angeletos, et al, 2001; and Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman, 2004) suggest
that individuals’ discount rates for a ﬁxed time interval are not constant, but decline
when the time interval is further away from the present.
Moreover, Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) provide the ﬁrst piece of evidence in-
dicating that time inconsistent models are preferable to the rational addiction model.
Based on individual-level cross-sectional data from Canada and the U.S., Gruber and
Mullainathan (2005) ﬁnd that smokers are happier after an increase in cigarette taxes.
If smokers’ happiness rises with cigarette taxes through a reduction in cigarette con-
sumption, rational smokers can achieve the same increase in happiness by reducing
cigarette consumption even in the absence of an increase in cigarette taxes. Thus,
Gruber and Mullainathan’s (2005) ﬁndings challenge the validity of the rational ad-
diction model. By contrast, these ﬁndings suggest that smokers are better described
as having time inconsistent preferences such that an increase in cigarette taxes will
help solve their self-control problem.
This study empirically investigates the implications of time inconsistent prefer-
2It is shown by Auld and Grootendorst (2004) that testing the Becker-Murphy rational addiction
model is likely to yield spurious supporting evidence when aggregate data are used.
3ences in the context of cigarette smoking. When smokers have time inconsistent pref-
erences which give rise to self-control problems, they have a demand for self-control de-
vices if they want to quit. Accordingly, smokers who have an intention to quit smoking
will support for public policies, which impose costs on smoking. From this implication,
we obtain a testable hypothesis that a smoker’s intention to quit smoking has a posi-
tive effect on her support for anti-smoking public policies, e.g., an increase in cigarette
excise taxes, a ban on smoking in all public areas, and a ban on workplace smoking.
We test this hypothesis based on individual survey data from Taiwan. Our hypothesis
testing relies on an empirical model, which accounts for the possible endogeneity of a
smoker’s intention to quit.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. We breiﬂy illustrate the time
inconsistent preferences associated with hyperbolic discounting and their implications
in Section 2. The data source and variables used in the empirical investigation are
described in Section 3. Our empirical model is illustrated in Section 4. The estimation
results are reported and discussed in Section 5. A conclusion is given in Section 6.
2 Time Inconsistent Preferences
2.1 A Synopsis
Time inconsistent preferences are proposed by Strotz (1956), and futher developed by
Phelps and Pollak (1968), Pollak (1968), Peleg and Yaari (1973), Yaari (1977), and
Goldman (1979, 1980). Motivated by ﬁndings from laboratory and ﬁeld studies indi-
cating that individuals are time inconsistent (e.g., Prelec and Loewenstein, 1991; and
Ainslie, 1992), there has been a recent revival in interest in time inconsistent prefer-
ences in the economic literature.
4Notable recent theoretical studies of addiction based on models of time inconsis-
tent preferences include O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b) Gruber and Köszegi (2001),
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002), and Gruber and Köszegi (2004). These papers consider
both the cases when individuals are aware of their own self-control problems and when
they do not know their self-control problems. The focus of O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999b) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2002) is on the effect of an individual’s awareness
of her own self-control problems. They ﬁnd that under realistic environments, an indi-
vidual’s awareness of her self-control problems mitigates the over-consumption of an
addictive product.
The purpose of Gruber and Köszegi (2001) is to show that a time inconsistent
model, where individuals are forward-looking but have time inconsistent preferences,
is able to generate the Becker and Murphy (1988) prediction that current consump-
tion depends positively on future consumption. They also show analytically that, due
to the existence of “internality,” there is room for government intervention, e.g., a tax
hike could be welfare improving. By adopting a time inconsistent formulation, Gruber
and Köszegi (2004) analyze the implications of an increase in cigarette excise taxes.
Cigarette excise taxes, serving as a self-control function, may beneﬁt a low income
smoker under the assumption that her demand for cigarettes is more price sensitive.
Time inconsistent preferences are characterized by discount rates which are much







where Ut is an individual’s time t lifetime utility, ct is the consumption level at time t,
u(ct) is single period utility at time t, and ± and ¯ are discount factors, with 1¸{±,¯}È
0. Formulation (1), which has been commonly adopted in the recent literature, is
ﬁrst developed by Phelps and Pollak (1968). Under this formulation the discount rate
5between the current period and the next period is 1¡±
± , while that between any two
consecutive periods beyond the current period is 1¡¯±
¯± , with 1¡±
± Ç 1¡¯±
¯± .3 Thus,
under formulation (1), from the perspective of the current period, the discount rate
between the current period and the next period is higher than that between any two
consecutive periods in the future. However, when the next period arrives, the discount
rate between that period and the following period is higher than that between any two
consecutive periods thereafter. This shift in the discount rate between two consecutive
periods leads an individual’s optimal choice in the current period to be different from
that chosen in the previous period, and the self-control problem arises.
2.2 A Simple Model
To demonstrate the role of self-control devices we consider a simple theoretical model
of decision making by a smoker. Our model is adapted from O’Donoghue and Rabin
(1999b, 2000), which is simplied by Peck and Laux (2004). In the model an inﬁnitively-
lived smoker faces two choices, i.e., to continue smoking or to quit. The two choices
yield different paths of lifetime utilities, i.e.,
{S,S,S,...}, if she continues smoking; and (2)
{Q,N,N,...}, if she quits smoking. (3)
where S, Q, and N are per-period utility, with QÇSÇN. We assume that the utility in
the period when she quits (i.e., Q) is less than that if she smokes in that period (i.e.,
S). By assuming QÇS, we want to capture the disutility from quitting. The higher per
period utility associated with abstinence (denoted by N, i.e., S Ç N) is due to the fact
3For ¯Æ1 we have the conventional exponential discounting formulation (as adopted by Becker and
Murphy, 1988).



















in order for her to quit.
Instead of quitting in the current period, she may consider quitting in the next













Since ¯ ·1, it is more likely for her to plan to quit in the next period than to actually
quit in the current period, as ±











This is because, when (6) holds she will not quit in the current period, but will plan to
quit in the next. However, when the next period arrives, she will again postpone her
plan for one more period. This postponing will continue for ever and she will never
execute her plan to quit.
An implication of time inconsistent preferences is that an individual, who realizes
her self-control problems, has a demand for commitment devices. To see this, we go
back to our example. If a smoker decides to quit in the next period (i.e., inequality (6)
holds) she may impose on herself a cost C, which is to be paid if she smokes in the next
7period. To be effective, C must be large enough such that when the next period comes










One example of such commitment devices is betting with a friend that one would suc-
ceed in quitting in the next period.4 The effectiveness of self-control strategies to
achieve smoking cessation is supported by experimental evidence obtained in the psy-
chology literature.5
3 Data and Variables
The empirical work of our study is based on survey data obtained from the Panel Study
of Family Dynamics (PSFD). The aim of the PSFD is to understand the structure and
evolution of the Chinese family in Taiwan, as well as the mode of interaction of its
members.6
The PSFD comprises multi-year panel surveys starting from 1999. The survey
adopts a three-stage random sampling procedure. In the ﬁrst stage, a number of geo-
graphical areas (cities or towns, which are equivalent to “standard metropolitan statis-
tical areas” in the U.S.) are randomly selected. The probability of a geographical area
being selected is proportional to its population size. In the second stage, smaller ad-
ministrative districts (communities, called “li” in Taiwan, and villages) are randomly
4See Prochaska, et al. (1982).
5See Murray and Hobbs (1981) and Grabowski and Hall (1985).
6The data, questionnaire, and details of the survey are available at
http://psfd.sinica.edu.tw/index_e.htm.
8drawn from the selected geographical areas. Again, the probability of a district be-
ing selected is proportional to its population size. In the third stage, individuals are
randomly drawn from the selected administrative districts.7
The PSFD sample mainly consists of three cohorts (age groups), i.e., individuals
born in 1934–1953, 1954–1963, and 1964–1978.8 The 1954–1963 cohort was ﬁrst in-
terviewed in 1999. In February 1999, a nationally representative, random sample of
individuals aged 36–45 (born 1954–1963) was drawn and interviewed. The targeted
sample size was 1,000, and 995 interviews were completed. The interviewing of the
1944–1953 and 1943–1934 cohorts started in 2,000. In February 2000, in addition
to interviewing the 1954–1963 cohort, a nationally-representative random sample of
individuals born in 1944–1953 and 1943–1934 was drawn and interviewed. These
individuals are interviewed in the spring every year. With a targeted number of re-
spondents of 2,000, the RI2000 survey successfully interviewed 1,959 individuals.
The interviewing of sampled individuals in the last cohort, i.e., those born in 1964–
1978, started in 2003. The sampling of respondents in the 1964–1978 cohort also
followed the three-stage random sampling procedure mentioned above. The targeted
number of respondents was 1,300, and only 1,230 interviews were actually completed.
In the 2004 PSFD questionnaire, there was a module on cigarette smoking behav-
ior. Due to the fact that a smoker’s demand for self-control is difﬁcult to measure, we
use her supportiveness for some smoking-related public policies as proxies. Informa-
tion on a smoker’s supportiveness for a public policy is collected by a set of questions:
7Given Taiwan’s population size of twenty-three million, our sample of around 3,000 is fairly rep-
resentative. The representativeness of the PSFD sample is comparable to that of the University of
Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). For the year 2001, there were 7,406 families in the
PSID sample, which was considered to be representative of the U.S. population of 284.8 million.
8Beginning in 2000, a sample of respondents, which consisted of children aged 16–26, were
interviewed.
9Do you support for the following public policies:
(A) An increase in cigarette excise taxes.
(B) Banning cigarette smoking in all public areas;
(C) Banning cigarette smoking in work places;
Possible answers to these questions are:
(5) Strongly supportive;
(4) Somewhat supportive;
(3) Neither supportive, nor against;
(2) Somewhat against;
(1) Strongly against
The variables which are constructed based on information collected from these three
questions are named, respectively, CigTax, BanPublic, and BanWork, which take val-
ues 1–5.
The implementation of these public policies will increase the costs of smoking.
Thus, a time consistent (i.e., “rational”) smoker, who does not have self-control prob-
lems, will not support for any of these policies regardless of whether or not she wants
to quit smoking. This is because a time consistent smoker is able to quit without any
difﬁculty once she ﬁnds that abstinence from smoking brings her greater lifetime util-
ity. Information on the repondents’ intention to quit (denoted by Quit) comes from a
question asking all smokers whether they have any intention to quit smoking in the
future or not.
Since we are mainly interested in the relationship between a smoker’s intention to
quit cigarette smoking and her demand for self-control devices, our empirical analysis
is conﬁned to current smokers. After deleting observations with missing values for the
variables that we use in the empirical analysis, the 2004 PSFD data contains 2,868
respondents, among which 23.30% were current smokers. Thus, our sample consists
of 669 current smokers.
All variables used in our empirical analysis are listed and deﬁned in Table 1, and
descriptive statistics of these variables are displayed in Table 2. The frequency dis-
10tributions of CigTax, BanPublic, and BanWork are displayed in Table 3. In order to
have an understanding of how CigTax, BanPublic, and BanWork are related to an in-
dividual’s smoking status and the intention to quit, in addition to reporting descriptive
statistics pertaining to our sample of current smokers, we also report those pertaining
to the 2004 PSFD full sample (which consists of both smokers and non-smokers) in
Tables 2 and 3.
According to columns 2–3 of Table 2, the means ofCigTax, BanPublic, and BanWork
for non-smokers are 3.78, 4.49, and 4.42, while the corresponding sample means for
smokers are 2.28, 4.00, and 3.47. A comparison of the sample means of these three
variables for non-smokers and smokers shows that non-smokers are more supportive
for a hike in cigarette excise taxes, a ban on cigarette smoking in all public areas, and a
ban on smoking in the work place. This is reasonable because a hike in cigarette excise
taxes will increase the monetary cost of smoking, and bans on cigarette smoking will
make it more inconvenient to smoke and smokers may have to refrain from smoking.
The sample means of CigTax, BanPublic, and BanWork pertaining to smokers who
intend to quit are 2.58, 4.16, 3.69, as reported in the third column of Table 2. They are
higher than the corresponding sample means pertaining to smokers who do not intend
to quit (i.e., 2.01, 3.86, and 3.27, as reported in the fourth column of Table 2). This is
consistent with our conjecture that smokers who intend to quit have a demand for self-
control devices. However, smokers who intend to quit are less supportive for the three
smoking-related public policies than non-smokers. supportive than non-smokers.
The frequency distributions of CigTax, BanPublic and BanWork in Table 3 show
that, of all anti-smoking public policies, the respondents’ (smokers or non-smokers
alike) supported for a cigarette excise tax hike the least. Moreover, when compared to
other public policies, the smokers’ disapproval of a cigarette excise tax increase was
particularly strong. There were 2.84% and 10.18% of smokers, respectively, who were
11strongly against and somewhat against a public area smoking ban; and 5.69% and
22.75% of smokers, respectively, who were strongly against and somewhat against a
workplace smoking ban. By contrast, 39.07% and 24.70% of smokers, respectively,
were strongly against and somewhat against an increase in cigarette excise taxes.
This pattern may reﬂect the general public’s dislike of taxation in Taiwan.
By comparing the frequency distributions of smokers with and without an inten-
tion to quit, we see that those who had an intention to quit did have a higher likelihood
being strongly supportive or somewhat supportive for an anti-smoking public policy.
4 Empirical Model
The objective of the empirical analysis is to examine the effect of a smoker’s intention
to quit on her demand for self-control devices, which is proxied by an her attitude to-
ward the three anti-smoking public policies (i.e., a hike in cigarette excise taxes, and
public area and workplace smoking bans). In our empirical speciﬁcation, the strength
of individual i’s support for policy k, denoted by ¦¤, is a function of her socio-economic
characteristics, denoted by Xi and her intention to quit, denoted by Qi, which corre-
sponds to the variable Quit in our data. That is,
¦¤
k Æ°kQi Å¯0
kXi Å²ki; k Æ1,2,3; (9)
where ²i is a residual term, which picks up omitted (unobserved) variables affecting
an individual’s attitude toward smoking-related public policies.
If people have a lack of self-control, as implied by hyperbolic discounting, a smoker
who intends to quit smoking will have a demand for self-control devices. This im-
plies that if smoker i intends to quit smoking, i.e., Qi Æ 1, her support for all three
anti-smoking public policies will be stronger, such that ° is positive. The null and
12alternative hypotheses that we are going to test are as follows:
H0 : °k Æ0 (as implied by time consistent preferences),
H1 : °k È0 (as implied by time inconsistent preferences).
In what follows, we will illustrate our empirical model in more detail. Since infor-
mation on an individual’s support for a certain public policy is solicited on a ﬁve-point
scale, we do not observe ¦¤
k. What we observe is a variable ¦k, which takes ﬁve possi-
ble values, i.e., 1–5.9
We assume the following relationship between ¦¤
k and ¦k:
¦k Æ j if ®kj¡1 Ç¦¤
k ·®kj; j Æ1,2,...,5; (10)
where ®j is a parameter to be estimated, and {®0,®5} are set to {¡1,1} for normaliza-
tion. Under speciﬁcation (10) we have an ordered choice model. We obtain an ordered
probit model for a smoker’s supportiveness for a public policy by further assuming that
²ki is standard normally distributed.
As an explanatory variable of a smoker’s supportiveness for a public policy, Qi is
likely to be endogenous. To account for this, we set up an empirical model for Qi and
allow a cross-equation correlation between the model for Qi and that for ¦¤
k. Since Qi









Q¤ Æ±0Zi Åui, (12)
where Q¤ is a latent variable, Zi is a vector of individual characteristics, consisting
of {Xi,Z1i}, ± is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and ui is a standard nor-
mally distributed residual. If the residuals ²ki and ui are correlated, Qi in regression
model (9) is endogenous, and estimating (9) without accounting for this endogeneity
9¦k corresponds to the three variables CigTax, BanPublic and BanWork in our data.
13will yield biased estimates of {°k,¯k}. Thus, we allow ²ki and ui to be correlated, i.e.,
corr(²ki,ui)Æ½k 6Æ0.10
In general, endogeneity arises from the presence of unobserved variables affect-
ing both the dependent variable of interest and the explanatory variables. In the
present case, endogeneity is potentially serious because the utilities associated with
the various smoking-related statuses (denoted by S, Q and N in our simple model in
Section 2.2) are not observable and they are likely to be the source of endogeneity in
model (9). Even though socio-economic characteristics are used to explain both Q¤
i and
¦¤
k, these utilities may not be totally captured by an individual’s observed characteris-
tics. The unexplained utilities may enter the residual terms ²ki and ui. The presence
of common unobserved variables in both ²ki and ui leads to correlation between the
two variables.
To make a conjecture on the sign of the correlation between ²ki and ui, we examine
equations (4) and (8) in Section 2.2. Equations (4) and (8), respectively, suggest that
while both the decision to quit and the size of the self-committed cost C depend on the
utilities associated with the three smoking statuses (i.e., Q, S, and N), they depend on
Q, S, and N in opposite directions. As is clear from equation (4), the likelihood of an
individual quitting increases with the beneﬁt from quitting (i.e., N¡S) and decreases
with the cost of quitting (i.e., S¡Q), i.e., it is positively related to N and Q, and nega-
tively to S. Conversely, according to equation (8), the size of the self-committed cost C
decreases with the beneﬁt of quitting and increases with the costs of quitting, i.e., it is
negatively related to N and Q, and positively to S. In our empirical model, the variable
10A more effective way to control for endogeneity would be to use longitudinal data so that we can
examine how a smoker’s supportiveness for an anti-smoking public policy changes when her intention
to quit changes. This control for endogeneity arises from time invariant heterogeneity, which affects
both variables. However, even though the PSFD survey is a longitudinal one, the health module is only
included in the 2004 questionnaire so that information on some key variables, e.g., the intention to quit
smoking, is only available from the 2004 survey.
14¦¤
it is a proxy for the self-committed cost C so that it is also negatively related to N and
Q, and positively to S. Given the impossibility of perfectly capturing the utilities Q, S,
and N using the individuals’ socio-economic characteristics in our regression models,
the uncaptured utilities will be absorbed by the error terms ²ki and ui, which are re-
lated to Q, S, and N in opposite directions. This implies that the correlation between
²ki and ui is negative.
The estimation of the simultaneous equations system, which consists of regression
equations (9) and (12), is performed by means of the maximum likelihood method. The
log-likelihood function for ¦k Æ j is as follows:























L1ji; j Æ1,...5; (14)
where N is the sample size.
For identiﬁcation purposes we impose an exclusion restriction, i.e., Z1i, are in-
cluded in (12), i.e., the model for Quit, but are excluded from (9), which pertains
to the supportiveness for a public policy. In other words, the variables Z1i are the
instruments used for identiﬁcation. In the current study, the vector Z1i consists of
two variables, namely WControl (i.e., pertaining to one’s weight control activities) and
HeardRisk (i.e., whether one has heard of the saying that cigarette smoking is seri-
ously harmful to one’s health).
By excluding these two variables from (9), we assume that they have direct effects
on an individual’s decision to quit only, but not on her supportiveness for an anti-
smoking public policy. More speciﬁcally, we impose the assumptions that cov(Z1i,²ki)Æ
150 and cov(Z1i,QijXi) 6Æ 0. The statistical testing of these two assumptions, to be ex-
plained in detail below, will be conducted. Intuitively, these assumptions are likely
to be valid. Having heard that cigarette smoking is associated with harmful health
effects (i.e., HeardRisk=1) is likely to prompt her to plan to quit. Having attempted to
lose weight, however, is likely to discourage a smoker from planning to quit because
it is well known that a cessation of smoking is often followed by a weight gain. These
two variables are unlikely to be directly related to whether or not a smoker supports
for an anti-smoking public policy.
It is noted that all exogenous variables (i.e., {Xi,Z1i}) are included in model (12),
which pertains to Quit, as explanatory variables. Because of this, the regression equa-
tion for Quit is speciﬁed as a reduced form equation. In this way, we do not need to
consider a structural speciﬁcation in modeling Quit. This minimizes the risk of mis-
speciﬁcation.
4.1 Weak Instruments Test
Since the reliability of our results hinges critically on the validity of our instruments
Z1i, it is important for us to make sure that Z1i are valid. In order to test the validity
of the instruments Z1i, a weak instruments test and a test for the exclusion restriction
are performed. Our weak instruments test involves estimating a univariate probit
model for (12) and testing for the explanatory power of Z1i by means of a likelihood
ratio test. The likelihood ratio test statistic, denoted by ¿Â, is chi-square distributed
with K (i.e., the number of instruments) degrees of freedom.
It is noted that Staiger and Stock (1997) recommend that instruments be weak
when the F-statistic is below the critical value of 10. However, we cannot perform the
conventional F-test based on (12) since it is a nonlinear model. The conventional F-
test, involving the computation of the sum of squared residuals for the restricted and
16unrestricted models, can only be computed for linear models, where the dependent
variable is linearly related to the error term. Yet, as the denominator degrees of free-
dom of an F-distributed variable approach inﬁnity, the random variable, if normalized
by its numerator degrees of freedom, is chi-square distributed.11 Thus, we can obtain
an F-statistic ¿F from our likelihood ratio test statistic as follows:
¿F Æ¿Â/K » F(K,1),
which has degrees of freedom {K,1}. With this F-statistic we are able to use Staiger
and Stock’s (1997) criterion to determine whether our instruments are weak or not.12
4.2 Overidentiﬁcation Restriction Test
We test the validity of the exclusion restriction, i.e., cov(Z1i,²ki)Æ0, by estimating an
unrestricted version of our simultaneous equations model (13), where both Z1i and Xi




kZ1i Åvki; k Æ1,2,3. (15)
A likelihood ratio test is conducted to test the null hypothesis H0 :¸Æ0, i.e., the exclu-
sion restrictions are valid. It is noted that in (15) no exclusion restriction is imposed.
A simultaneous equations probit model can be estimated without imposing an exclu-
sion restriction because the binary endogenous regressor is a nonlinear function of its
explanatory variables. See Wilde (2000) for a proof. Our test is similar to Rashad and
Kaestner’s (2004).
11Denote an F-distributed random variable by f, with f Æ
x1/n1
x2/n2, where both x1 and x2 are chi-square
distributed random variables with degrees of freedom n1 and n2. As n2 approaches inﬁnity, x2 ap-
proaches its expected value of n2. This implies that f/n1 is asymptotically chi-square distributed with
n1 degrees of freedom as n2 tends to inﬁnity.
12As a cross-check, we estimate (12) with a linear probability model and compute the F-statistic based
on the results.
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Our estimation results are reported in Tables 4–9. Before examining whether our con-
jecture concerning self-control is supported by the estimation results, we ﬁrst examine
the speciﬁcation of our empirical model. The likelihood ratio test for the explanatory
power of our instruments WControl and HeardRisk yields a Â2-statistic of 39.1985,
which is asymptotically equivalent to an F-statistic of 19.5993. This F-statistic is
larger than the Staiger-Stock (1997) critical value of 10, indicating that our instru-
ments are not weak with respect to Quit.13
In addition, we have also performed tests for the validity of the exclusion restric-
tions, i.e., overidentiﬁcation restrictions. The likelihood ratio tests of the null hypoth-
esis that “Z1i are not correlated with an individual’s supportiveness for a smoking-
related public policy” yield test statistics of 3.4428, 1.4412, and 0.9456, respectively, for
the models pertaining to CigTax, BanPublic, and BanWork. With p-values of 0.1788,
0.4864, and 0.6233, respectively, we accept the null hypothesis for all three public
policies. See the bottom of Tables 4–6.
Moreover, we have conducted Hausman tests, which compare the changes in Quit’s
coefﬁcients with and without allowing the variable to be endogenous, to examine the
endogeneity of Quit. In the case of the model pertaining to CigTax, the test statistic,
having a p-value of 0.1038, is almost signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The Hausman test
indicates, albeit short of overwhelmingly, that Quit is likely to be endogenous. For
models pertaining to BanPublic and BanWork, the Hausman test statistics, with p-
values of 0.0167 and 0.0168, respectively, are signiﬁcant at conventional levels. This
indicates that Quit is endogenous in the two models. The Hausman test statistics are
13We have also run an OLS regression of Quit on {Xi,Z1i} (i.e., a linear probability model is employed)
and conducted an F-test to test for the explanatory power of Z1i. This yields an F-statistic of 19.59,
which is remarkably consistent with our probit-based likelihood ratio test.
18reported in the bottom at Tables 4, 6, and 8.
Table 4 pertains to estimation results of the effects of an individual’s intention to
quit on her support for a cigarette excise tax hike. The estimate of the correlation
coefﬁcient between ²1i and ui, denoted by ½k in Table 4, is statistically signiﬁcant.
The sign of the coefﬁcient estimate of ½k coincides with our conjecture concerning the
correlation between the error terms of the models for CigTax and Quit in Section 4.
We conjecture in Section 4 that due to the impossibility of perfectly capturing utilities
associated with different smoking statuses by means of demographic variables in the
empirical model, the error terms pertaining to CigTax and Quit will absorb these
uncaptured utilities. The negative correlation between the two error terms is due to
the fact that the utilities associated with different smoking statuses are related to the
quit decision and the strength of self-control in opposite directions. Our ﬁnding of a
negative correlation coefﬁcient reinforces the plausibility of the hyperbolic discounting
framework in describing smoking behavior.
The results in the ﬁrst column of Table 4 show that the coefﬁcient estimate of Quit
is positive and statistically signﬁcant. This positive coefﬁcient is supportive of our
hypothesis that those who intend to quit smoking are more likely to support for a
hike in cigarette excise taxes. The positive marginal effects of Quit on CigTax=5 and
CigTax=4 (the highest level of support for a cigarette excise tax hike), with numerical
values of 0.1220 and 0.1700, respectively, are very substantial. Moreover, the marginal
effect of Quit on CigTax=1 (i.e., strongly disapprove of an increase in cigarette taxes)
of -0.3387, testiﬁes to the strong impact of the individual’s intention to quit on her
supportiveness for a hike in cigarette taxes. Actually the magnitudes of these marginal
effects of Quit are much larger than those pertaining to all other variables. Thus, the
effects of Quit are numerically very important in regard to a smoker’s supportiveness
for a cigarette excise tax hike, and it is the most important variable explaining a
19smoker’s tax hike supportiveness.
A smoker’s age (denoted by Age), health status (denoted by Health), and the pres-
ence of other smokers at home or at work (denoted by SecondHand) are important
determinants of her support for an increase in cigarette excise taxes. According to the
estimation results in the ﬁrst column of Table 4, an older smoker or a healthier smoker
is more supportive for a tax hike. If there are other people who smoke in the smoker’s
home or workplace, she is also more likely to support for a tax hike.
A smoker’s other demographic variables such as years of education (denoted by
Education), gender (denoted by Sex), being married (denoted by Married), income
level (denoted by Income), and number of children (denoted by Child) are not able to
explain her supportiveness for a hike in cigarette excise taxes.
According to the second column of Table 4, a smoker’s years of education, health
status, having heard of the saying that cigarette smoking is seriously harmful to a
person’s health (denoted by HeardRisk), and engagement in a program to lose weight
(denoted by WControl) are able to explain her intention to quit smoking. A smoker,
who has more education, is in poor health, has heard of the saying that smoking is
seriously harmful to a person’s health, or engages in a program to lose weight, is more
likely to have an intention to quit smoking.
Other factors, such as an individual’s age, gender, marital status, income level,
number of children, and the presence of other smokers at the home/workplace, do not
have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on a smoker’s intention to quit smoking.
The results pertaining to a smoker’s supportiveness for a smoking ban in public
areas is presented in Table 6. The coefﬁcient of Quit in the ﬁrst column of the table
is numerically and statistically signiﬁcant. This shows that a smoker’s intention to
quit has a positive effect on her supportiveness for a public area smoking ban. This,
again, is supportive for our hypothesis that a smoker’s intention to quit leads her to de-
20mand a self-control device, as implied by time inconsistent preferences. The marginal
effects of Quit (as displayed in Table 7) are very large. Having an intention to quit
increases a smoker’s probability of strongly supporting for a public area smoking ban
(i.e., BanPublic=5) by 0.3450. This marginal effect on strongly supporting for such a
smoking ban is the largest among all explanatory variables.
Another piece of evidence supporting the validity of our hypothesis that smokers
have self-control problems is the negative coefﬁcient estimate of the correlation be-
tween the error terms pertaining to BanPublic and Quit (denoted by ½k in Table 6).
Our estimate of this correlation coefﬁcient is statistically and numerically signiﬁcant.
As conjectured in Section 4 according to our simple model with hyperbolic discount-
ing, the correlation coefﬁcient of the two error terms should be negative. This negative
coefﬁcient estimate also explains the fact that if cross-equation correlation is not al-
lowed, the coefﬁcient for Quit is seriously downward-biased (see the third column of
Table 6).
The qualitative pattern of the estimation results pertaining to other explanatory
variables is similar to that associated with CigTax. The exception is that the positive
effect of a smoker’s age is statistically signiﬁcant in explaining CigTax, but it becomes
statistically insigniﬁcant in explaining BanPublic.
The estimation results pertaining to a smoker’s supportiveness for a smoking ban
in workplaces is presented in Table 8. Similar to the results corresponding to CigTax
and BanPublic, with the coefﬁcient of Quit being positive and statistically signiﬁcant
in explaining BanWork, we ﬁnd that a smoker’s intention to quit is able to enhance her
supportiveness for a workplace smoking ban. As reported in Table 9, having an inten-
tion to quit increases the probabilities of a smoker strongly supporting and moderately
supporting (i.e., BanWork=5 and BanWork=4, respectively) for a workplace smoking ban
by 0.2980 and 0.0768, respectively, and decreases the probabilities of her strongly dis-
21approving and somewhat disapproving (i.e., BanWork=1 and BanWork=2, respectively)
such a policy by 0.1227 and 0.2105, respectively. These marginal effects are larger
than those pertaining to all other variables.
The correlation coefﬁcients between the error terms of BanWork and Quit are neg-
ative and statistically signiﬁcant, supporting our a priori conjecture. Furthermore, a
comparison of Quit’s estimated coefﬁcients with and without allowing for such a cor-
relation coefﬁcient suggests that, without allowing for ½k, the coefﬁcient estimate of
Quit is seriously biased.
Qualitatively, the pattern of ﬁndings concerning the other explanatory variables
is similar to that corresponding to CigTax. A smoker’s age and the presence of other
smokers at home or at work have a negative effect on her supportiveness for a work-
place smoking ban. All other explanatory variables are statistically insigniﬁcant in
explaining a smoker’s supportiveness for a workplace smoking ban.
To summarize, our empirical results indicate that smokers, who have a plan to
quit in the future, are more likely to support for anti-smoking public policies, sug-
gesting that smokers are likely to have time inconsistent preferences and to discount
the future hyperbolically.14 With time inconsistent preferences, a smoker is likely to
postpone any plan to quit. Thus, if she plans to quit, due to her time inconsistent pref-
erences, her plan will never be executed. In realizing her self-control problem, such a
smoker will have a demand for self-control devices in order to circumvent this prob-
lem. Since an anti-smoking public policy helps a smoker to execute her plan to quit by
raising the costs of smoking, a smoker with time inconsistent preferences will support
for such a public policy if she plans to quit smoking.
14We have also obtained empirical results when a binary public policy supportiveness variable is used
(where a value of 1 is coded for “strongly supportive” or “somewhat supportive” and 0 is coded for other
responses). The results thus obtained are similar to those we report in the paper. These additional
results, which are not reported in the paper, are available upon request.
226 Conclusion
If individuals have time inconsistent preferences, as created by hyperbolic discounting,
they have self-control problems. An implication of time inconsistent preferences in the
context of cigarette smoking is that smokers who want to quit will have a demand for
self-control devices in order to avoid perpetual procrastination.
This study tests a hypothesis derived from this implication. According to this hy-
pothesis a smoker’s intention to quit smoking has a positive effect on her support for
public policies, which impose costs on smokers (i.e., an increase in cigarette excise
taxes, a ban on smoking in all public areas, and a ban on workplace smoking). We
test this hypothesis based on individual survey data from Taiwan. We carry out our
hypothesis testing by means of an empirical model, which accounts for the possible
endogeneity of a smoker’s intention to quit. The endogeneity of the quit intention is
suggested by our simple theoretical model.
We obtain empirical results that are strongly supportive for our hypothesis. The
estimation results show that a smoker’s intention to quit smoking does have a posi-
tive effect on her supportiveness for an anti-smoking public policy, and this effect is
numerically very signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding suggests that smokers do have self-control
problems such that they have a demand for self-control devices when they want to
quit smoking. In addition, our ﬁnding also casts doubt on the validity of Becker and
Murphy’s (1988) rational addiction model where individuals’ preferences are assumed
to be time consistent. Under the rational addiction model a current smoker will not
support for any anti-smoking public policy, regardless of whether she intends to quit
or not, and she may support for such public policies only when she has quit.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the quit intention is endogenous as an explanatory variable
in the case of a smoker’s supportiveness for an anti-smoking policy. The pattern of
23endogeneity coincides with that predicted by our theoretical model. This lends addi-
tional support to the validity of time inconsistent preferences in the context of cigarette
smoking.
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30Table 1: Variable Deﬁnition
CigTax Whether supportive for or against an increase in cigarette excise tax or not. Possible
answers are: 1 (Strongly against), 2 (Somewhat against), 3 (Neither supportive, nor
Against), 4 (Somewhat supportive), and 5 (strongly supportive).
BanPublic Whether supportive for or against a ban on smoking inall public areas or not. Possible
answers are: 1 (Strongly against), 2 (Somewhat against), 3 (Neither supportive, nor
Against), 4 (Somewhat supportive), and 5 (strongly supportive).
BanWork Whether supportive for or against a ban on smoking in the workplace or not. Possible
answers are: 1 (Strongly against), 2 (Somewhat against), 3 (Neither supportive, nor
Against), 4 (Somewhat supportive), and 5 (strongly supportive).
Quit Whether intend to quit in the future or not. Deﬁned as
Quit=1 if yes, and Quit=0 if no.
Education Years of schooling.
Age Age.
Sex Gender of respondent. Deﬁned as
Sex=1 if male, and Sex=0 if female.
Married Whether married. Deﬁned as
Married=1 if married,
Married=0 if single, divorced, or widowed.
Health Self evaluated health status. Possible answers are
Health=1 if very good,
Health=2 if good,
Health=3 if just ok,
Health=4 if not very good,
Health=5 if very poor.
Income Average monthly labor income in the previous year divided by 100,000.
Child Number of children.
SecondHand Whether or not there is secondhand smoke at home or in workplace;
SecondHand=1 if yes, and SecondHand=0 if no.
HeardRisk Whether one has heard of the saying that cigarette smoking has serious harmful effects
on one’s health. Deﬁned as
HeardRisk=1 if yes, and HeardRisk=0 if no.
WControl Weight control programs. Deﬁned as
WControl=1 if the respondent attempts to lose a lot of weight,
WControl=2 if the respondent attempts to lose weight slightly,
WControl=3 if the respondent attempts to maintain the current weight,
WControl=4 if the respondent is not engaging in any weight control activities,
WControl=5 if the respondent attempts to gain a little weight,
WControl=6 if the respondent attempts to gain a lot of weight.
31Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Full Non-Smoker Smoker Sample
Sample Sample All Smokers Quit=1 Quit=0
Quit 0.1116 0.0000 0.4790 1.0000 0.0000
(0.3149) (0.4999)
CigTax 3.4289 3.7764 2.2844 2.5812 2.0115
(1.3906) (1.2138) (1.3210) (1.3782) (1.2051)
BanPublic 4.3801 4.4941 4.0045 4.1625 3.8592
(0.8497) (0.7467) (1.0397) (0.9428) (1.1029)
BanWork 4.1960 4.4159 3.4716 3.6938 3.2672
(0.9963) (0.7986) (1.2161) (1.1664) (1.2267)
Education 0.9354 0.9186 0.9907 1.0616 0.9256
(0.4629) (0.4852) (0.3753) (0.3688) (0.3699)
Age 0.4940 0.5009 0.4711 0.4591 0.4822
(0.1169) (0.1167) (0.1144) (0.1084) (0.1188)
Sex 0.4878 0.3668 0.8862 0.8969 0.8764
(0.4999) (0.4820) (0.3178) (0.3046) (0.3296)
Married 0.7936 0.7977 0.7799 0.7750 0.7845
(0.4048) (0.4018) (0.4146) (0.4182) (0.4118)
Health 2.5321 2.5423 2.4985 2.5125 2.4856
(0.9858) (0.9966) (0.9492) (0.8992) (0.9941)
Income 0.0042 0.0035 0.0064 0.0085 0.0044
(0.0494) (0.0427) (0.0668) (0.0788) (0.0536)
Child 2.4630 2.5418 2.2036 2.0375 2.3563
(1.4712) (1.4523) (1.5038) (1.4292) (1.5557)
SecondHand 1.9355 2.0223 1.6497 1.6625 1.6379
(0.6711) (0.6482) (0.6662) (0.6567) (0.6756)
WControl 3.3298 3.2973 3.4371 3.2406 3.6178
(1.9493) (2.1749) (0.8504) (0.9208) (0.7364)
HeardRisk 0.9135 0.9145 0.9102 0.9563 0.8678
(0.2811) (0.2796) (0.2861) (0.2049) (0.3392)
Sample Size 2868 2200 668 320 348
32Table 3: Attitude Toward Smoking-Related Public Policies
Full Non-Smoker Smoker Sample
Sample Sample All Smokers Quit=1 Quit=0
CigTax Frequency
(5) Strongly supportive 0.2936 0.3627 0.0659 0.1000 0.0345
(4) Somewhat supportive 0.2559 0.2786 0.1811 0.2375 0.1293
(3) Neither supportive nor against 0.1726 0.1900 0.1153 0.0938 0.1351
(2) Somewhat against 0.1416 0.1095 0.2470 0.2813 0.2155
(1) Strongly against 0.1363 0.0591 0.3907 0.2875 0.4856
BanPublic Frequency
(5) Strongly supportive 0.5485 0.6073 0.3548 0.4094 0.3046
(4) Somewhat supportive 0.3466 0.3141 0.4536 0.4531 0.4540
(3) Neither supportive nor against 0.0526 0.0500 0.0614 0.0469 0.0747
(2) Somewhat against 0.0411 0.0227 0.1018 0.0719 0.1293
(1) Strongly against 0.0112 0.0059 0.0284 0.0187 0.0374
BanWork Frequency
(5) Strongly supportive 0.4840 0.5649 0.2156 0.2719 0.1638
(4) Somewhat supportive 0.3407 0.3288 0.3817 0.4156 0.3506
(3) Neither supportive nor against 0.0795 0.0677 0.1183 0.0813 0.1523
(2) Somewhat against 0.0791 0.0341 0.2275 0.1969 0.2557
(1) Strongly against 0.0167 0.0045 0.0569 0.0344 0.0776
Sample Size 2868 2200 698 320 348
33Table 4: Effects of Intention to Quit on Support for an Increase in Cigarette Tax†
Endogenous Speciﬁcation Exogenous Speciﬁcation
CigTax Quit CigTax Quit
Quit 0.9464¤¤ — 0.4707¤¤ —
( 3.1015) — ( 5.3907) —
Education 0.0225 0.0564¤¤ 0.0337¤¤ 0.0515¤¤
( 1.2308) ( 3.3233) ( 2.2251) ( 3.0129)
Age 0.0171¤¤ -0.0002 0.0175¤¤ -0.0017
( 3.2065) (-0.0254) ( 3.3141) (-0.2658)
Sex -0.1737 0.2081 -0.1292 0.2326
(-1.3579) ( 1.3160) (-1.0193) ( 1.4733)
Married 0.0813 0.0638 0.1105 0.0772
( 0.7082) ( 0.4475) ( 0.9378) ( 0.5445)
Health -0.0969¤¤ 0.0971¤ -0.0840¤ 0.0938¤
(-2.1128) ( 1.7190) (-1.8046) ( 1.6610)
Income -0.0042 0.0065 -0.0039 0.0068
(-0.2180) ( 0.5536) (-0.1938) ( 0.5572)
Child -0.0743¤ -0.0053 -0.0850¤ -0.0031
(-1.7447) (-0.1014) (-1.9271) (-0.0593)
SecondHand 0.1331¤¤ 0.0160 0.1349¤¤ 0.0309
( 2.0654) ( 0.2111) ( 2.0947) ( 0.4070)
HeardRisk — -0.3034¤¤ — 0.5794¤¤
— (-4.9310) — ( 2.8441)
WControl — 0.5585¤¤ — -0.3085¤¤
— ( 2.7918) — (-5.0251)
®1 2.7506¤¤ — 2.7707¤¤ —
( 7.0909) — ( 7.3449) —
®2 1.8977¤¤ — 1.9023¤¤ —
( 5.0449) — ( 5.1156) —
®3 1.5617¤¤ — 1.5454¤¤ —
( 4.2064) — ( 4.1946) —
®4 0.9204¤¤ — 0.8878¤¤ —
( 2.5052) — ( 2.4273) —
Constant — -0.5754 — -0.5106
— (-1.1510) — (-1.0196)
½k -0.3158 0.0000
(-1.5568) —
Log Like. -1365.8779 -1367.0922
Observations 668 668
Hausman Test 2.6467 [0.1038]
Overidentiﬁcation Test‡ 3.4428 [0.1788]
Weak Instruments Test† † † 39.1985 [3.0772e-009]
†Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets.
‡Likelihood ratio test of the statistical signiﬁcance of Z1i in the CigTax equation.
† † †Likelihood ratio test of the explanatory power of Z1i in the Quit equation. ¤¤Signiﬁcant at 5% level. ¤Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
34Table 5: Marginal Effects—CigTax
CigTax=5 CigTax=4 CigTax=3 CigTax=2 CigTax=1
Quit 0.1220 0.1700 0.0502 0.0035 -0.3387
Education 0.0027 0.0043 0.0014 0.00020 -0.00821
Age 0.0020 0.0033 0.0010 0.0002 -0.0064
Sex -0.0231 -0.0335 -0.0094 0.0012 0.0638
Married 0.0094 0.0154 0.0051 0.0012 -0.0302
Health -0.0116 -0.0186 -0.0059 -0.0009 0.0364
Income -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0004£10¡1 0.0016
Child -0.0089 -0.0142 -0.0045 -0.0007 0.0276
SecondHand 0.0124 0.0243 0.0095 0.0060 -0.0509
WControl 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0010
HeardRisk -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0007
35Table 6: Effects of Intention to Quit on Support for a Public Areas Smoking Ban†
Endogenous Speciﬁcation Exogenous Speciﬁcation
BanPublic Quit CigTax Quit
Quit 0.9777¤¤ — 0.3217¤¤ —
( 3.3935) — ( 3.6162) —
Education -0.0001 0.0520¤¤ 0.0159 0.0486¤¤
(-0.0068) ( 3.0309) ( 1.0847) ( 2.8212)
Age 0.0062 -0.0007 0.0042 -0.0014
( 1.2180) (-0.1043) ( 0.7905) (-0.2284)
Sex 0.0077 0.2069 0.0366 0.1869
( 0.0590) ( 1.2987) ( 0.2711) ( 1.1751)
Married 0.1228 0.0715 0.1375 0.0477
( 1.0447) ( 0.5087) ( 1.1738) ( 0.3396)
Health 0.0063 0.0872 0.0332 0.0668
( 0.1381) ( 1.5528) ( 0.7207) ( 1.1835)
Income -0.0055 0.0060 -0.0053 0.0061
(-0.8138) ( 0.6894) (-0.8713) ( 0.7353)
Child -0.0176 -0.0024 -0.0130 -0.0012
(-0.4428) (-0.0475) (-0.3198) (-0.0239)
SecondHand 0.0990 0.0037 0.1052 0.0040
( 1.4449) ( 0.0485) ( 1.5637) ( 0.0515)
HeardRisk — -0.2963¤¤ — -0.2971¤¤
— (-4.7807) — (-4.7733)
WControl — 0.5889¤¤ — 0.5903¤¤
— ( 3.0869) — ( 2.9076)
®1 1.3522¤¤ — 1.2487¤¤ —
( 3.7354) — ( 3.2525) —
®2 0.1682 — -0.0220 —
( 0.4669) — (-0.0581) —
®3 -0.0998 — -0.2933 —
(-0.2753) — (-0.7786) —
®4 -0.8272¤¤ — -1.0760¤¤ —
(-2.1282) — (-2.7195) —
Constant — -0.5235 — -0.3594
— (-1.0250) — (-0.7031)
½k -0.4647¤¤ 0.0000
(-2.4296) —
Log Like. -1237.181 -1240.3801
Observations 668 668
Hausman Test 5.7313 [0.0167]
Overidentiﬁcation Test‡ 1.4412 [0.4864]
Weak Instruments Test† † † 39.1985 [3.0772e-009]
†Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets.
‡Likelihood ratio test of the statistical signiﬁcance of Z1i in the BanPublic equation.
† † †Likelihood ratio test of the explanatory power of Z1i in the Quit equation. ¤¤Signiﬁcant at 5% level. ¤Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
36Table 7: Marginal Effects—BanPublic
BanPublic=5 BanPublic=4 BanPublic=3 BanPublic=2 BanPublic=1
Quit 0.3450 -0.0870 -0.0578 -0.1311 -0.0760
Education -0.0003 0.0006£10¡1 0.0001£10¡1 0.0005£10¡1 0.0003£10¡1
Age 0.0023 -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0005
Sex 0.0018 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0005
Married 0.0438 -0.0096 -0.0078 -0.0177 -0.0096
Health 0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0004
Income -0.0020 0.0005 0.0004 0.0008 0.0004
Child -0.0064 0.0016 0.0011 0.0025 0.0013
SecondHand 0.0344 -0.0049 -0.0062 -0.0150 -0.0089
WControl 0.0012 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0001
HeardRisk -0.0030 -0.0009 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003
37Table 8: Effects of Intention to Quit on Support for a Workplace Smoking Ban†
Endogenous Speciﬁcation Exogenous Speciﬁcation
BanWork Quit BanWork Quit
Quit 1.0391¤¤ 0.3901¤¤ —
( 3.6414) ( 4.4319) —
Education 0.0100 0.0575¤¤ 0.0293¤¤ 0.0498¤¤
( 0.5918) ( 3.3902) ( 2.0890) ( 2.9105)
Age 2.0160¤¤ -0.0468 2.0876¤¤ -0.1823
( 3.9015) (-0.0745) ( 4.2856) (-0.2891)
Sex -0.1923 0.2260 -0.1481 0.2325
(-1.3803) ( 1.4339) (-1.0713) ( 1.4749)
Married 0.0232 0.1222 0.0548 0.0827
( 0.2026) ( 0.8840) ( 0.4864) ( 0.5963)
Health -0.0099 0.1007¤ 0.0144 0.0938¤
(-0.2153) ( 1.7781) ( 0.3286) ( 1.6551)
Income -0.0016 0.0059 -0.0015 0.0066
(-0.2365) ( 0.6648) (-0.2447) ( 0.7704)
Child -0.0322 -0.0078 -0.0373 -0.0054
(-0.7926) (-0.1557) (-0.9145) (-0.1075)
SecondHand 0.2259¤¤ 0.0236 0.2439¤¤ 0.0261
( 3.2547) ( 0.3098) ( 3.6138) ( 0.3430)
WControl — 0.4856¤¤ —- 0.5704¤¤
— ( 2.5818) —- ( 2.7836)
HeardRisk — -0.3003¤¤ —- -0.2988¤¤
— (-4.8961) —- (-4.7840)
®1 2.4500¤¤ 2.5559¤¤ —
( 6.4998) ( 7.2380) —
®2 1.4249¤¤ 1.4641¤¤ —
( 4.0038) ( 4.2322) —
®3 1.1079¤¤ 1.1292¤¤ —
( 3.1449) ( 3.2746) —
®4 0.1044 0.0616 —
( 0.2985) ( 0.1775) —
Constant — -0.5884 — -0.5025
— (-1.2095) — (-1.0007)
½k -0.4468¤¤ 0.000
(-2.3140) —
Log Like. -1365.2054 -1367.4636
Observations 668 668
Hausman Test 5.7163 [0.0168]
Overidentiﬁcation Test‡ 0.9456 [0.6233]
Weak Instruments Test† † † 39.1985 [3.0772e-009]
†Asymptotic t-statistics are in parentheses and p-values are in square brackets.
‡Likelihood ratio test of the statistical signiﬁcance of Z1i in the BanWork equation.
† † †Likelihood ratio test of the explanatory power of Z1i in the Quit equation. ¤¤Signiﬁcant at 5% level. ¤Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
38Table 9: Marginal Effects—BanWork
BanWork=5 BanWork=4 BanWork=3 BanWork=2 BanWork=1
Quit 0.2980 0.0768 -0.0443 -0.2105 -0.1227
Education 0.00276 0.0009 -0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0011
Age 0.5810 0.1821 -0.0933 -0.4428 -0.2317
Sex -0.0591 -0.0129 0.0102 0.0421 0.0198
Married 0.0064 0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0049 -0.0026
Health -0.0031 -0.0010 0.0005 0.0023 0.0012
Income -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0007£10¡1 0.0004 0.0002
Child -0.0093 -0.0029 0.0015 0.0071 0.0037
SecondHand 0.0516 0.0365 -0.0040 -0.0466 -0.0376
WControl 0.0007 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0003
HeardRisk -0.0012 -0.0010 0.0000 0.0005 0.0004
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